File Name: searle proper names and intentionality .zip
There is a fairly general consensus that names are Millian or Russellian genuine terms, that is, are singular terms whose sole semantic function is to introduce a referent into the propositions expressed by sentences containing the term. This answers the question as to what sort of proposition is expressed by use of sentences containing names. But there is a second serious semantic problem about proper names, that of how the referents of proper names are determined. This is the question that I will discuss in this paper.
In philosophy, intentionality is the power of minds and mental states to be about, to represent, or to stand for, things, properties and states of affairs. Furthermore, to the extent that a speaker utters words from some natural language or draws pictures or symbols from a formal language for the purpose of conveying to others the contents of her mental states, these artifacts used by a speaker too have contents or intentionality. A picture of a dog, a proper name e. A complete thought, a full sentence or a picture can stand for or describe a state of affairs. How could some of the represented things e.
John R. Searle is one of the world's leading philosophers. During his long and outstanding career, he has made groundbreaking and lasting contributions to the philosophy of language, to the philosophy of mind, as well as to the nature, structure, and functioning of social reality. EN English Deutsch. Your documents are now available to view.
Searle: “Proper Names and Intentionality”. Searle's Account Of The Problem. In this essay, Searle emphasizes the notion of 'Intentional content'.
This book deals with the main proponents of the causal and descriptivist reference theories on natural kind terms. The two main types of contemporary reference theories on natural kind terms are the causal and the descriptivist theories. The author analyzes the main versions of these two types of theories and claims that the differences between them are not as great as it is usually assumed. He alleges that the ostensive reference fixing and reference borrowing theories should be descriptive-causal, and he also adduces that the relation of kind-identity depends on the views on kind-identity and thus involves descriptive elements.
Christopher Hurtado. How names refer to objects has been a perennial problem in the philosophy of language. The descriptivist account has long prevailed. But is it correct? Before Kripke came along and attacked it, many philosophers thought it was.
He was Willis S. Widely noted for his contributions to the philosophy of language , philosophy of mind , and social philosophy , he began teaching at UC Berkeley in In the late s, Searle challenged the restrictions of Berkeley's rent stabilization ordinance. Following what came to be known as the California Supreme Court's "Searle Decision" of , Berkeley changed its rent control policy, leading to large rent increases between and Searle's early work on speech acts , influenced by J.
In the philosophy of language , the descriptivist theory of proper names also descriptivist theory of reference  is the view that the meaning or semantic content of a proper name is identical to the descriptions associated with it by speakers, while their referents are determined to be the objects that satisfy these descriptions. Bertrand Russell and Gottlob Frege have both been associated with the descriptivist theory, which is sometimes called the Frege—Russell view. In the s, this theory came under attack from causal theorists such as Saul Kripke , Hilary Putnam and others. However, it has seen something of a revival in recent years, especially under the form of what are called two-dimensional semantic theories. This latter trend is exemplified by the theories of David Chalmers , among others. A simple descriptivist theory of names can be thought of as follows: for every proper name p , there is some collection of descriptions D associated with p that constitute the meaning of p.
INTENTIONALITY*. BY. JOHN R. SEARLE. I. The Nature of the Problem. The problem of proper names ought to be easy, and at one level I think it is: we need to.
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