File Name: hannah arendt responsibility and judgment .zip
Powered by WP Bannerize. Arendt was profoundly and painfully aware of the horrors of political evil; in fact, she is almost unparalleled in 20 th century thought in her concern for the consequences of mass political violence, the victims of political atrocities, and the most vulnerable in political society — the stateless, the pariahs, the outcasts. At least, this is the case in her discussions of concrete, historical political situations.
Yet in her philosophical writings, she continues to argue that the political realm ultimately redeems human existence, and furthermore, that politics should remain distinct and autonomous from moral evaluation. This can leave many of us feeling both perplexed and deeply uncomfortable with the theory of human action that Arendt proposes. Some, like George Kateb, have attempted to reconstruct her account with the addition of traditional moral concerns as limiting factors. In fact, Arendt articulates — though not overtly — an ethics of plurality, insisting on an ethical component to judgment and action.
Instead, Arendt appears to envisage a politics that is not reigned in by a moral system, but guided by a political ethic that arises from the potential of political action itself. She never explicitly describes the latter ethic, but we glimpse it in her discussion of forgiving and promising as moral faculties that are also, essentially, political. It becomes simple to follow universal prescriptions righteously and yet unthinkingly.
In fact, the habit of turning to them may shut down the thinking process altogether. The comfort and familiarity of universal standards makes them ultimately useless; they work only so long as they are comfortable and familiar, that is, as long as everything is proceeding normally. First, the very structure of universal normative claims makes it easy to adopt them unthinkingly, so that we lessen our ability to act as thinking moral agents the more we rely on them.
Second, they are ultimately unreliable; they occupy a place so general and unquestioned in our thoughts that ultimately, others just as general and unquestioned can replace them. Since such claims lead to thoughtlessness, they fail to provide us with the tools for real moral critique and evaluation.
They may reinforce particular moral codes, but they actually undermine rather than reinforce moral agency. Arendt is defending moral agency, not arguing for its irrelevance. While Socratic morality based on the activity of thinking was chiefly concerned with avoiding evil, Christian ethics, based on the faculty of the will, puts the accent entirely on performing, on doing good.
What does it mean for pure goodness to leave both the self and the world behind? Goodness as a moral absolute must, by its nature, trump all other claims. I threaten not only the plurality of opinions that constitutes the public realm, but also the freedom of other actors. Such an ideal is just as incompatible with, even destructive of, the conditions of human flourishing — that is, for Arendt, the shared political realm based on overlapping perceptions and common, public experience — as the universal moral prescriptions favored by Eichmann.
If both universal moral precepts and absolute ideals like goodness are ultimately harmful to politics, where can political morality ever hope to find a foothold? Arendt criticized customary morality for failing to produce individual moral agents, and Christian morality for not respecting the plural nature of a public realm composed of the same. The Socratic morality of conscience, however, is based on our ability to think and the experience of plurality — that is, of difference — in this solitary activity.
It is worst for me to commit wrong because even were I to escape all punishment, I would then be forced to live out my days with a wrongdoer — my own self — in unbearable intimacy.
Of course, to experience the pain of this unbearable intimacy, some intimacy must take place. For Arendt this duality only arises in the experience of thinking: the two-in-one discourse with myself that happens in solitude. Thinking takes place without natural end or purpose except as a kind of by-product.
It is not dependent on intelligence or sophistication, and is naturally satisfying. Those who cannot think, the thoughtless, never achieve this all-important individuation. Once again, Arendt focuses on the constituting conditions of rich moral agency — in this case, the development of good judgment and conscience — rather than privileging any one normative approach or set of moral precepts for the moral agent to follow.
Clearly, Arendt places a great deal of faith in our capacity to think, but she concedes that it is not essentially political. As a result, they find themselves unused to politics and the requirements of good political judgment. This reversal means that thinking and political action can come into conflict as competing priorities, and that one can endanger the other.
But they are not necessarily antagonistic. For one thing, thinking can act as preparation for political judgment even if a life entirely dedicated to thinking does not.
In discourse with myself, I have my first essential experience of plurality, the space for difference of opinion and conflict. Then, thinking reference to the self as moral standard takes on political significance.
Someone who limits his own actions by what he cannot live with the memory of is a kind of anti-Eichmann. This resistance is nothing other than political resistance, borne out of moral consideration. As the various critiques of morality discussed above demonstrate, Arendt is deeply critical of any attempt to impose any external standards upon political action, or to limit and change its nature — even if such an attempt is made for deeply moral, even humanitarian reasons.
Yet if action cannot properly be moderated by normative claims arising from universal moral standards, Christian goodness, or even wholly by the Socratic conscience, what alternative does Arendt suggest? Readiness to forgive, and be forgiven, and a willingness to make and keep promises to others are the only precepts to emerge from sheer willingness to engage in a political enterprise.
Certainly, the importance of making and keeping promises to other is the foundation of many theories of political obligation, including the tradition of social contracts, in political philosophy. It is hardly surprising Arendt would list it as a necessary political attitude. More controversial, however, is her turn to turn to forgiveness. It has the quality of freedom, since in forgiving we act unexpectedly and spontaneously by refusing to perpetuate cycles of revenge and violence, and it also corresponds to the human condition of plurality.
Thus, as a moral faculty, our ability to forgive arises primarily from our connection to the publicly grounded, shared space of others: the political realm. What exactly does Arendt mean by forgiveness? Her account differs from other philosophical discussions in that she pays little attention to the emotional dimension of forgiving. Arendt has little time for moral sentiments in politics; she claims that sentiments like compassion and pity — while virtuous in the private sphere — become vices in politics.
Rather than a matter of emotional change, therefore, forgiving is best understood as a political act , and the readiness to forgive as a publicly recognizable political stance. Indeed, Arendt suggests that forgiveness bears the same relation to action as destruction does to creation.
Clearly acts of forgiveness, however magnanimous, have no supernatural counterfactual ability. They cannot literally undo the events of the past. Nor is it clear that Arendt imagines forgiveness to be an act of deception or historical amnesia, in which past traumas are covered over and ignored. But if forgiveness is relevantly like punishment, it cannot forsake responsibility and accountability for the past — this would defy the purpose of retributive punishment altogether.
The clue to understanding Arendtian forgiveness lies in the connection she makes between the doer and the deed, in her discussion of action. Yet there is tremendous danger in this identification if the identity that emerges confines us to our worst deeds, without hope of recovery.
This does not mean that the deed vanishes from public memory, however this new, revelatory act shifts its original meaning. Just as an apology by the wrongdoer can change the initial message of a wrongdoing, so too can forgiveness by the injured party alter the relationship between the two. As Andrew Schaap explains, Arendtian readiness to forgive displays a willingness to re-enter the sphere of political debate with former enemies and combatants, forsaking the apolitical methods of vengeance and violence.
It does not signal an end or final reconciliation, therefore, but — like all Arendtian political action — a new beginning. In other words, what Arendt refers to as acts of forgiveness are the renewals of trust required to sustain a political space of verbal and not violent disputes. They are grounded in our ongoing commitment to that sphere a responsibility to the common world Arendt calls amor mundi as well as our respect for those who are our co-participants in it. Yet this respect, and the forgiveness it engenders, is not an all-encompassing solution to political violence.
Yet forgiveness alone cannot provide generate a moral code sufficient to protect the political sphere from the dangers of individual and institutional wrongdoing. But neither of these is able to wholly defend her from the charge of amorality or even anti-morality , if the category of action itself remains immune to normative evaluation.
I began my paper with this quotation:. Arendt is insisting that the sui generis character of individual acts and the status of action qua category as the highest of human activities means that action must be judged by its own potentialities; no external standard can possibly be appropriate, since all other human categories are themselves redeemed — that is, made valuable — by the potential of action. Just what are these principles? Arendt continues to resist any metaphysics of ethical action.
The actor herself may not be aware of the principle she instantiates, as she is caught up in her own — ultimately irrelevant — motives and goals.
The principle, as the specific meaning of the deed, is only fully available to the spectator who judges and immortalizes it in narrative and history. This is, perhaps, the most helpful formulation; the principle of an act is the ideal that we identify after the fact as having brought together political actors at a specific moment to achieve something great.
Thus Arendt describes how love of freedom is manifest in the struggle of the American Founding Fathers, or equality in the civil rights movement and the early labor movement.
Since Arendt claims we do not act freely when we subsume particular circumstances under general laws, she needs to explain how we have access to these elusive principles in the first place, if not by an act of subsumption. She does this by appropriating an account of judgment from Kant, albeit in a highly idiosyncratic manner, drawing not on his overtly moral and political philosophy but by claiming to articulate the political philosophy dormant in his aesthetic writings: specifically, our judgment of the beautiful.
In good political judgment, I abstract from my own view and interests in order to represent those who are not present. Since these judgments are reflective, not determinative, we do not access political principles as universals but rather through our comprehension and memory of apt examples that are, quite literally, representative of the principle; that is, I represent them to myself when judging. This is the picture of Arendtian action that we have so far: although judgment and will are necessary preparation for action, genuine action only takes place to the extent it is free — that is, not wholly determined by these but inspired by a principle.
Thinking is not directly connected to action, but is a kind of preparation for the enlarged mentality required for judgment, and is also significant after the act, when taken up by the spectator in story. Because action is free, personal motives and interests do not determine it. Also, it is spontaneous and unpredictable, its consequences ultimately unknown.
This means that action is not properly judged either by motives and goals, on the one hand, or by consequences, on the other but by the quality of the principle it instantiates. For this picture to be ultimately convincing, it seems to me that at least two questions still need to be answered. The first of these is the criteria for judging principles themselves. It is our greatest responsibility, therefore, to struggle for the creation and perpetuation of such a shared public world; we achieve this only when people act together in concert.
Those principles that enhance and perpetuate conditions of plurality and freedom are good; those which harm it are not, because they destroy what is most valuable in human existence. Arendtian action is ultimately judged by the same standard that determines when we can forgive its particular transgressions.
The criteria for judging Arendtian principles may be the final obstacle to grasping Arendtian political action, but locating their proper ground — that is, the political responsibility generated by amor mundi — raises a final and perhaps more disturbing question.
Can Arendtian action, even in the ideal circumstances she describes, protect the conditions of its own possibility? I believe her answer is no, and her view of the human condition is ultimately tragic. The frailty — the irony, even — of human existence consists in this: the very conditions which make human existence valuable and give it meaning the freedom of political action and the diversity of human plurality simultaneously introduce an element of arbitrariness to our actions in the case of freedom and prevent us from ever having control over what we do and suffer in the case of plurality.
Human political action cannot be redeemed; it can only be remedied. Yet her reasons for so limiting herself are ultimately compelling; in grounding her moral concerns in what she sees as most humanly valuable, that is, the free and plural nature of human action, Arendt has insisted on an ethics that refuses to transgress any of these conditions.
Arendt, The Human Condition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
This section of the book will be profitably read by those seeking a succinct overview of the Eichmann controversy. She argues that if thinking is an aimless activity that undermines normative criteria, then it cannot contribute to moral reasoning, and therefore, it cannot prevent evil actions. Unfortunately, Mahony, in spite of her best efforts, conflates the activities of thinking and judging throughout the book and elides any substantive discussion of the interrelated activity of willing. Mahony interprets Arendt as a moral realist moral truths are possible and absolute p. According to Mahony, anyone who lives with themselves does not think about what might be wrong to do; they simply know that certain actions are incompatible with who they are.
Powered by WP Bannerize. Arendt was profoundly and painfully aware of the horrors of political evil; in fact, she is almost unparalleled in 20 th century thought in her concern for the consequences of mass political violence, the victims of political atrocities, and the most vulnerable in political society — the stateless, the pariahs, the outcasts. At least, this is the case in her discussions of concrete, historical political situations. Yet in her philosophical writings, she continues to argue that the political realm ultimately redeems human existence, and furthermore, that politics should remain distinct and autonomous from moral evaluation. This can leave many of us feeling both perplexed and deeply uncomfortable with the theory of human action that Arendt proposes. Some, like George Kateb, have attempted to reconstruct her account with the addition of traditional moral concerns as limiting factors.
uENekHDeupahd - Read and download Hannah Arendt's book Responsibility and Judgment in PDF, EPub online. Free Responsibility and Judgment.
Political theorist Hannah Arendt — wrote little on Asia, but her Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil suggests how she might have evaluated responsibility for and judgment of war crimes in East Asia. I speculate first about how she might have regarded the — International Military Tribunal for the Far East, and I argue that she would have approved of the executions of those ruled culpable for the Rape of Nanjing while contesting much of the moral and legal thinking that led to them. Project MUSE promotes the creation and dissemination of essential humanities and social science resources through collaboration with libraries, publishers, and scholars worldwide.
Johanna "Hannah" Arendt — was a German-American political theorist and social philosopher. Hannah Arendt was born in in Hanover. In , after having completed her high school studies, she went to Marburg University to study with Martin Heidegger. The encounter with Heidegger, with whom she had a brief but intense love-affair, had a lasting influence on her thought.
Even in our golden age of Arendt studies, Schwartz offers a compelling full-scale rethinking of this great philosopher's work. Jonathan Peter Schwartz is the first to make Arendt's reflections on the theme of judgment the subject of a full-length book, and he does justice to the breadth and depth of her theorizing. Arguing that previous interpretations of Arendt failed to fully appreciate the central place of judgment in her thought, Schwartz contends that understanding Arendt's ideas requires not only interpreting her published work but also reconstructing her thinking from a broader range of sources, including her various essays, lecture course notes, unpublished material, and correspondence.
Her many books and articles have had a lasting influence on political theory and philosophy. Arendt is widely considered one of the most important political thinkers of the 20th century. Arendt was born in Linden , a district of Hanover , in , to a Jewish family.
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One train branches out of her characterization of Adolf Eichmann as a thoughtless being, and it mostly consists of both her exploration of the possible relation between thinking and morality and her quest for an autonomous source of morality. In this other case, Arendt suggests a reevaluation of the Socratic phronimos by way of the Kantian notions of sensus communis and enlarged mentality. The result is her concept of Judging. Indeed, flowing steadily throughout her oeuvre is an undercurrent of attempts to recover an authentically political experience, a loss men have suffered in their modern surrender to necessity.
О мой Бог! - воскликнула Сьюзан. - Дэвид, ты просто гений. ГЛАВА 121 - Семь минут! - оповестил техник. - Восемь рядов по восемь! - возбужденно воскликнула Сьюзан. Соши быстро печатала. Фонтейн наблюдал молча.
Rather my concern in this article is to examine the continued relevance of Arendt's writing on responsibility and judgment 4 for legal academics. After the trial of.
Она потянулась к Дэвиду. Это ей снится. Трудно было даже пошевельнуться: события вчерашнего дня вычерпали все ее силы без остатка. - Дэвид… - тихо простонала. Ответа не последовало.
Тепло дня здесь сменяется влажной прохладой, а шум улицы приглушается мощными каменными стенами. Никакое количество люстр под сводами не в состоянии осветить бесконечную тьму. Тени повсюду. И только в вышине витражи окон впускают внутрь уродство мира, окрашивая его в красновато-синие тона.
Ноги Беккера скрылись из виду за поворотом, и Халохот выстрелил, но тут же понял, что выстрел пришелся в пустоту. Пуля срикошетила от стены. Рванувшись вниз за своей жертвой, он продолжал держаться вплотную к внешней стене, что позволило бы ему стрелять под наибольшим углом.
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